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This report was prepared as a formal submission to the 
European Commission in response to its invitation for 
consultation  on  the  review  of  the  auctioning  time 
profile  of  the  EU  ETS.  This  report  draws  on 
discussions that took place among the members of the 
CEPS Carbon Market Forum (CMF). 
The CMF provides a neutral space where policy-makers and regulators are able to 
meet carbon market participants and other stakeholders to discuss carbon market 
regulation and general policy issues. The contents of this report reflect the general 
tone  and  direction  of  discussions  on  specific  topics  within  the  CMF,  but  its 
findings do not necessarily represent a full common position agreed by all the 
participants  in  the  CMF,  nor  do  they  necessarily  represent  the  views  of  the 
institutions to which the participants belong. 
Andrei Marcu is Senior Advisor and Head of the CEPS Carbon Market Forum. 
The views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and 
not to any institution with which he is associated. 
 
  
 
 
Executive Summary 
The  EU  ETS  (Emissions  Trading  System)  is  a  pure  regulatory  construct  and  one  that  has 
functioned  well  as  a  market.  An  ETS  should  be  the  most  cost-effective  system  to  promote 
reductions in greenhouse gases and act as the cornerstone in EU’s climate policy. Currently, 
some have the perception that the EU ETS has not delivered on some of its implicit objectives, 
including  to  serve  as  an  instrument  to  encourage  investments  to  meet  long-term  targets  for 
GHGs in 2050.  
A supply imbalance has been observed in the EU ETS, possibly temporary, which has led to 
some volatility in the market. As a result, a number of issues, real or perceived, need to be 
addressed: 
a)  A significant oversupply in the market that may linger beyond 2020 
b)  A large supply coming in 2012-13 
c)  An inflexible ETS on the supply side 
d)  The need to provide for longer-term structural changes that will affect the EU ETS, including 
other policies and measures that may be needed to accompany the ETS in some areas.  
In providing answers, we need to make sure that we know which market failure, or potential 
market failure, we aim to address.  
Backloading can only be introduced as a measure to address a market imbalance and ensure 
good market functioning. It should not be a measure to target a price outcome. 
If  implemented  on  its  own,  backloading  will  likely  lead  to  the  need  for  further  one-off 
interventions, which should be avoided. It should be part of a set of measures that will include, 
as  a  next step,  an  examination  of  long-term  structural  measures  that  are  needed  to address 
points c & d above.  
If backloading is to be an effective tool, it should have a number of characteristics: 
  It should be significant and forceful to ensure a strong political and economic signal. 
  Communication must be clear and unambiguous.  
  A significant time lag between when the set aside takes place and when the volumes may 
be returned to the market. 
  The volume of backloading should be larger in 2013.  
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Background 
On 25 July 2012, the European Commission issued an invitation for Public Consultation entitled 
“Consultation on review of the auctioning time profile for the EU Emissions Trading Scheme” in 
order to collect views from stakeholders and experts in the field of the EU carbon market on a draft 
for  a  future  amendment  of  the  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  No  1031/2010  on  the  timing, 
administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances. 
In this submission, the CEPS Carbon Market Forum addresses the questions below and offers 
its views on the Commission’s proposed amendments: 
  Is back loading a good idea? 
  Is there a need for following up the back loading with structural measures? 
  What should the number be? If this cannot be addressed, what are the considerations for 
deciding upon that number?  
  What price expectations are linked to the number? On what basis are they construed? 
1.  The GHG Market – Facts and Views 
The EU ETS has been conceived as a pure regulatory market whose stated objective is to “promote 
reductions of greenhouse emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner”. It was 
intended to become the cornerstone of the EU climate change policy and help reach targets under 
the Kyoto Protocol as well as EU climate change policies in general. 
While the EU ETS was, as a cap-and-trade system, modelled on the CO2 programme in the United 
States, it must be emphasised that beyond the similarity in their environmental dimensions, they 
are very different due to size/scale, economic/competitive impact, global reach and technology 
implications. 
For some, the unstated objectives of the EU ETS were to drive not only operational change, but 
especially a technological revolution and also steer capital towards cleaner sources of energy, and 
assist with energy efficiency, and the development and deployment of renewables. 
For others, GHG markets are a technologically neutral instrument of price discovery, helping to 
minimise the overall societal costs of compliance with GHG obligations. In such a view, if the price 
of carbon becomes zero in a particular trading period, it is not a concern, as it would signal that the 
problem is solved, and there is no demand for the product (allowances).  
However, it must be emphasised that the problem referred to addresses the reduction of GHG 
emissions from anthropogenic sources by 90% in 2050, and not only an in-period objective, while 
we still have substantive long-term, un-met objectives. Only by meeting both the short-term and 
long-term  objectives  can  economic  efficacy  be  achieved.  This  requires  a  visibility  of  the 
environmental objective post-2020.  
The GHG market has certain unique features, including:  
  The traded product can be seen as having the characteristics of both a commodity and a 
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  While its demand varies with a number of factors, supply is inelastic and is based on a 
number of factors, including a forecast of economic activity, well in advance in some cases.  
The EU ETS has gotten off the ground rapidly and has become the flagship of the EU climate 
change programme, and the hub and main demand for international credits. Its functioning has 
offered many lessons that have been adopted by emerging and developing ETS around the world, 
such as Australia, California, China, Korea, etc.  
The  EU  ETS  itself  has  applied  many  of  the  lessons  learned,  as  witnessed  by  the  increase  in 
auctioning, allocation at the EU level, the move to one Community Registry, the change in security 
provisions, etc. 
The market created by the EU ETS has functioned well, as measured against some of the criteria 
that reflect good market functioning, including: a credible level of periodic scarcity in the market; 
the presence of liquidity in the market, although many participants; a tight spread between bid 
and ask prices; the ability to enter and exit the market at all times; adequate market transparency 
and information; and the fact that the market is not driven by market power.  
The EU ETS and carbon are deeply connected to the energy markets. At its inception, it was felt 
that carbon, as a commodity, would lead to and trigger arbitrage between different sources of 
energy. At present, however, carbon seems to be following the lead of the energy markets. Having 
energy policies that are established at the national level and a climate change policy that is set at 
the EU level creates tension as the two sets of policies are closely linked. 
Concerns have been voiced about the price of carbon and the level of volatility. Volatility is closely 
linked to the level of liquidity in the market, with high liquidity dampening volatility. Volatility is 
negative when it manifests itself through abrupt price fluctuations, in a non-transparent way. It is 
also important to point out that, compared to other energy commodities, carbon prices have not 
shown a high degree of volatility. 
The current low price levels in the EU ETS, especially on the EUA side, have created fears of a 
decrease in liquidity, as many intermediaries may exit the market. While this is, and must be seen, 
as  an  individual  choice  for  market  players,  the  resulting  decrease  in  liquidity  would  impact 
negatively what has been until now sound market functioning.  
Due to a series of factors, including inaccurate emissions data and non-banking in Phase 2, the end 
of Phase 1 in 2007 saw the price of carbon plummet to zero. 
Currently, there is a large and growing imbalance in the supply/demand equation, especially due 
to the financial and economic crisis. This imbalance may be temporary in nature, especially given 
the  long-term  objectives  of  EU  climate  change  policy.  In  the  Staff  Working  Document  (SWD) 
accompanying  its  proposals  released  on  July  25th,  the  European  Commission  expected  an 
oversupply at the end of 2020 to be on the order of 1.4 billion tonnes, with more recent data 
suggesting higher numbers, such as 1.4 or even 2 billion tonnes.  
The current imbalance in the market resulted from economic conditions that were totally outside 
the  bandwidth  of  what  the  EU  ETS  was  designed  for  --  economic  conditions  that  have  been 
unprecedented for the last 80 years. In addition, a larger than expected supply of renewables has 
also impacted the level of GHG emissions, and therefore demand, for allowances. 
Moreover, a large inflow of new supply is expected in 2012-13, due to a number of factors: 
  Early auctioning 
  National NER (new entrants’ reserve) that will likely be auctioned 
  NER 300, 200 million in 2012, another 100 million in early 2013 
  Some CERs (industrial gases) will come in large quantities as their usefulness comes to an 
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2.  What are we trying to solve? 
Given the situation identified above, there are a number of issues, real or perceived, that need to be 
considered: 
a)  A significant oversupply in the market that may linger beyond 2020 
b)  A large supply coming in 2012-13 
c)  An inflexible ETS on the supply side, which may require future interventions and the need to 
introduce some measure of flexibility 
d)  The need to provide for longer-term structural changes that will affect the EU ETS, including 
other policies and measures that may be needed to accompany the ETS in some areas.  
In providing answers to these issues, we need to make sure that we know what market failure, or 
potential market failure, in the absence of an intervention by the regulator, we are addressing.  
It must be emphasised that through backloading we cannot, and do not intend, to address the 
inconsistencies between various policies that affect climate change, including energy and climate 
change, or address post-2020 targets.   
3.  Backloading 
Backloading must be seen, designed and put in a framework that will guarantee that it ensures 
good market functioning. It is a rebalancing measure, to allow the large incoming supply and 
existing oversupply in the market to be absorbed in an orderly fashion.  
What is needed is for supply to enter the market during the 2013-20 period in a way that is not 
disruptive and does not produce abrupt price changes. In the absence of any intervention, we are 
certain  to  see  continued  abrupt  price  fluctuations  now,  to  be  followed  by  potential  renewed 
volatility at the end of the third trading period. 
It must be noted that the CER market has reached a price level where its good functioning can be 
called into question. However, the current market situation for EUAs is also not totally dissimilar 
from that at the end of Period 1, except that prices have not totally collapsed due to a number of 
factors listed below: 
  The expectation of intervention by the Regulator with a package of both short-term and long-
term structural measures 
  The possibility of banking allowances from Phase 2 to Phase 3 and 
  The connection to future phases beyond 2020. 
Backloading is a measure that can and should be implemented on its own at this time, as it can be 
rapidly put in place and does not alter the decisions related to intra-period market supply.  
The  GHG  market  is  driven  by  sentiment,  and  backloading  at  this  time,  especially  if  done 
forcefully, can impact the market by providing a demand signal that is more in line with what the 
demand/supply balance is expected to be in the long term. 
There are a number of conditions that must be met if backloading is to have any chance of being 
effective in meeting the stated objectives: 
  It should be significant and forceful. Different models will provide different outcomes for 
levels of backloading. This is about market fundamentals, market sentiment and political 
signals. Given the current situation, any backloading less than one billion tonnes will be 
seen  as  reflecting  a  lack  of  political  commitment,  which  may  become  a  self-fulfilling 
prophecy. At the same time, there needs to be awareness that the legitimate markets’ need 
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  Communication on the number and the terms of backloading, as well as the other steps that 
will  be  undertaken  as  part  of  structural  change  programme,  must  be  clear  and 
unambiguous. Mixed signals from the European Commission in the run-up to the July 25th 
announcement have somewhat shaken market confidence in the cohesion of the regulator 
and politicians on the EU ETS.  
  There must be a significant time lag between when the set-aside takes place and when the 
volumes may be returned to the market. 
  There  must  be  a  larger  backloading  volume  in  2013,  given  the  current  situation,  with 
potentially decreasing amounts after that. 
  There  must  be  clarity  this  is  not  a  measure  to  remove  the  supply  permanently,  since 
structural  oversupply  and  lack  of  flexibility  to  adapt  to  changing  conditions  will  be 
addressed in a comprehensive way through measures that will take longer to consider and 
agree, but for which there is political will. 
  Clarity on the issue of long-term measures will alleviate any fears that this is an ad-hoc and 
capricious intervention in the market, to be repeated at the pleasure of the regulator, without 
clear political guidance and parameters, which every regulator intervening in the market 
must follow. 
Resolution of the issues listed at the start of section 2 (points c and d) is likely to require much 
lengthier consideration and political negotiations, and also to result in delaying an action that is 
essential for good market functioning for the upcoming period. 
Backloading is not a measure that should be considered in order to ensure a price target. Rather, it 
should be introduced to bring about good market functioning, with the objective of ensuring that 
the ETS remains a credible instrument for price discovery for GHG mitigation measures. 
Backloading will not address all the issues raised. To be effective it must be part of a broad set of 
measures that also address potentially long-term structural issues. 
For  backloading  to  succeed,  the scope  of  the  long-term measures  to  be  considered  to  address 
points c&d must be outlined in a clear and unambiguous manner, in any outcome of the current 
policy discussion. To do otherwise will again test the trust of stakeholders and market participants 
in the level of support that the instrument has at the regulatory and political levels. 
Various models have provided different price outcomes for the scenarios outlined by the European 
Commission in the documents it released on July 25th. They vary, sometimes widely, depending on 
the model and the modeller. However, backloading, or any other measure that may be envisaged 
in the future, should not be based on a price target. That would deny the benefit that a market 
approach is supposed to bring.  
What backloading should ensure, and the number selected should accomplish, is a credible level of 
scarcity that will allow for good market functioning. No visible scarcity within the time horizon 
when there is a price and EUA contract on the market, does not meet the test set in the Directive.  
4.  Observations of the CEPS CMF on the Proposed Amendments 
With a view to contributing to the Commission’s Consultation process, the CEPS Carbon Market 
Forum offers the following observations on the proposed amendments: 
  The  accompanying  proposal  to  amend  the  Auctioning  Regulation  is  very  specific  to  the 
numbers  and  timelines  proposed,  and  in  our  view  addresses  the  issue  at  hand  in  an 
appropriate manner. 
  The  proposed  amendment  to  the  EU  ETS  Directive  reads  “The  Commission  shall,  where 
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  We understand that the proposed amendment to the EU ETS Directive is meant to ensure 
clarity, avoid any potential legal challenges, as well as ensure that any future legal challenge 
will not be successful.  
  We feel that it is broad in nature and gives a lot of latitude to the regulator, which in many 
ways is needed, and should be welcomed. 
  However, such authority is not customarily given to a regulator, unless it is accompanied by 
clear guidelines and definitions. 
  That kind of debate should take place within the context of ensuring long-term flexibility to 
ensure a proper functioning of the EU ETS, as well as take into account other important 
aspects, such as carbon leakage for trade-exposed industries. 
  Consequently, we feel that at this time, an amendment to the Directive should also provide a 
reference to a review of the Directive that will address the supply/demand imbalances and 
promote economic efficiency. This will ensure that flexibility is inserted in a deliberate way, 
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